Durban II: Obama's First Train Wreck?

Sometimes, watching foreign policy being made is like watching a train wreck in slow motion. Most presidential administrations have early train wrecks in foreign policy, usually because they haven't mastered the bureaucratic nature of policy-making. Part of the learning curve is figuring out how to rein in different parts of the bureaucracy, getting them to work together for a common goal. Some administrations learn this more quickly than others. If there was a central cause of the train wreck which followed the successful invasion of Iraq in the last administration, it was an unwillingness on Bush's part to give detailed direction to different parts of the bureaucracy, leaving State and various branches of Defense to work at cross-purposes, in which defeating each other's policy preferences became more important than succeeding overall.

President Obama already has this "my people are working on it, I'll get back to you" approach to foreign policy, and it looks like Durban II will be the first public train wreck he has to show for it. An unintended benefit of having Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State is that she is bringing into the State Department the experienced, centrist Democratic foreign policy types who first flocked to her campaign when it looked like she was the likely next president. She is trying to squeeze what was a White House-in-waiting into the much smaller State Department. (e.g.: The galaxy of "special envoys," each of whom was a potential Secretary of State in his own right.) The left-wing lunatic academic types who flocked to the Obama campaign wound up being shunted off to the UN and the NSC, where they presumably could do less harm.

Not entirely, however. U.S. participation in the Durban II preparatory conference is an early bid by the crazies to push their own ideological agendas and bid for foreign policy relevance. They apparently want to show that their preference to making nice with Third World maniacs will garner results, and they don't entirely disagree with some of those maniacs' broadsides against the West in general and Israel in particular. The result is that they are undercutting American allies who were preparing to get out of this circus before it was too late, while not succeeding at all in changing the tone of the upcoming conference (which, by the way, taking place in Geneva will get a whole lot more publicity in the world press than Durban I, in much more out-of-the-way Durban.) But now that they are involved in the conference, they will resist pulling out even when the upcoming disaster becomes obvious.

President Obama's unwillingness at this point to get involved, particularly where it would wind up humiliating some of his early supporters in the bureaucracy, will keep this going far too long. As I said at the beginning, like watching a train wreck in slow motion....

Update (March 2): I've now seen press reports to the effect that, in quiet statements to various people behind the scenes, the U.S. government has indicated that we will not participate further in Durban II. Apparently the whole thing became too embarrassing to be covered up. But note how quietly we are pulling out: To make a big deal of it would "ruin the chances for more diplomatic engagement" in the future (i.e.: our new UN crowd will try things like this again when/where they think they can get away from it), not to mention highlighting the fact that this should have been a no-brainer from the beginning. It also minimizes the possibility that our pull-out will lead a boycott by others. I guess, in this instance, the U.S. is not "ready to lead again."

Obama's Do-over

Saw the speech to Congress last night. Initial gut reaction: Not bad as far as it went. It seemed like that was his do-over for the supremely forgetable inaugural address, which seemed to leave the vast throng looking at each other and going, "Huh?" This time, he outlined domestic goals for the next four years (interestingly, referred to in quasi-Freudian manner as "my first term") clearly and at the top of his form. ("Top of his form," for President Obama, means well-articulated but vague. Kind of like the proverbial cuisine which tastes really good at the time but leaves you hungry an hour later when you realize there really wasn't all that much substance there.) The criticism that there wasn't a lot of detail is just carping; the occasion didn't call for detail, but for reassurance and broad outlines.

Also, clearly, the occasion didn't call for much on foreign policy (the one aspect in which this wasn't entirely an inaugural speech do-over.) There were a few sentences thrown in as an obvious after-thought essentially saying "we'll handle it" for major foreign policy challenges, including Iraq, terrorism, and the Middle East. In effect, 'I've got people working on it, and we'll get back to you.' OK for now but, as with the ambitious domestic goals (including the cure for cancer, which I remember at least both Nixon and Carter pledging in speeches they made to Congress), details to come later.